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Abstract
Users like sharing personal photos with others through
social media. At the same time, they might want to make
automatic identification in such photos difficult or even im-
possible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are
not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would
expect [28, 37, 18]. Recent studies on adversarial image
perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse re-
cognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts.
However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs
[7], it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particu-
lar when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game
theory provides tools for studying the interaction between
agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a
general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser
dynamics, and present a case study that involves current
state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We
derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an up-
per bound on the recognition rate independent of the re-
cogniser’s counter measure. Code is available at https:
//goo.gl/hgvbNK.
1. Introduction
People nowadays share massive amounts of personal photos
through social media. Personal photos contain rich private
information, e.g. about family members, travel destinations,
and political activities. Together with recent developments
in computer vision techniques [4, 11, 8, 27, 34], this res-
ults in increasing concerns that malicious entities employ-
ing computer vision technologies could extract private in-
formation from visual data.
Classical obfuscation techniques, such as face blurring
and pixellisation, is not only unpleasant but also ineffective
against convnet-based recognisers [28, 37, 18].
There have been recent studies on adversarial image per-
turbations (AIP): carefully crafted additive perturbations on
the image that confuses a convnet while being nearly invis-
Figure 1: A game between a social media user and a re-
cogniser over a photo. The user perturbs the image using
orange strategy, trying to confuse the recogniser. The re-
cogniser chooses blue strategy as a counter measure. They
do not know which strategy is picked by the other.
ible to human eyes [36, 6, 21, 20]. AIPs are indeed prom-
ising as obfuscation techniques.
However, it remains a question whether AIPs are still
effective when counter measures are taken. For example,
[7] proposed simple image processing tactics to counter the
AIP effects (e.g. blurring by small amount). If furthermore
the particular choice of counter measure is unknown, the
best strategy is not obvious for the user.
Game theory provides useful tools for analysis when
there exist uncertainties in the strategies for each player.
We present a game theoretical framework to describe a sys-
tem in which the user and recogniser strive for antagonistic
goals: dis-/enabling recognition. This framework makes it
possible to derive guarantees on the user’s level of privacy,
independent of the recogniser’s counter measure, from an
explicitly formulated set of assumptions. We include a case
study of a person identification game, deriving the user’s
privacy guarantee with respect to the current state of the art
AIP and person recognition methods.
This paper showcases the utility of game theory in un-
derstanding the user-recogniser dynamics. The framework
can be extended beyond the particular settings considered.
We believe this framework will further aid user-recogniser
analyses in more diverse tasks and setups.
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We list our contributions as follows:
• A game theoretic framework for studying the user-
recogniser dynamics.
• Application of adversarial image perturbation (AIP)
as an effective and aesthetic technique for person ob-
fuscation.
• Novel robust and recogniser-selective AIPs.
• An empirical case study of the game theoretic frame-
work, leading to the privacy guarantees for the user.
2. Related Work
Privacy and computer vision. While there exists a bulk
of research on user privacy traditionally led by the security
community [22, 39, 23, 19], studies on private content in
visual data began only recently [37, 28, 18].
Wilber et al. [37] studied the performance of a commer-
cial face detector under multiple face obfuscation methods
(blur, darkening, camouflage glasses, etc.). Oh et al. [28]
and McPherson et al. [18] studied the face recognition per-
formance. In particular, [28] showed that current recog-
nisers can adapt to obfuscation patterns. Above works con-
clude that recognisers can be robust against simple obfus-
cation methods like face blurring. In this work, we study a
stronger obfuscation type: adversarial image perturbations.
Adversarial image perturbation (AIP). Szegedy et al.
[36] first studied the phenomenon of adversarial instabil-
ity of convnets: it is possible to generate invisible addit-
ive perturbations that completely fool a recogniser. The
initial crafting algorithm was based on the L-BFGS [36];
more efficient first-order algorithms have been proposed
[6, 31, 21, 12]. We review existing AIP algorithms and our
novel variants conceptually and empirically.
Robust classification against AIPs. Some pre-convnet
works considered enhancing general robustness of classi-
fiers by training on adversarial data. Lanckriet et al. [13]
trained a linear classifier on adversarial data constrained to
a fixed mean and covariance for each class. Brückner et
al. [3] introduced game theoretic concepts to formalise the
adversarial training procedure. However, they limited their
attention to simpler models: linear [13] or convex [3]. This
work builds on a game theoretic framework which accom-
modates state of the art convnet models.
Since the advent of effective convnets [11] and corres-
ponding AIP algorithms [36], some works [6, 10] have con-
sidered training convnets with AIPs, achieving robustness
against AIPs to some extent. On the other hand, Graese et
al. [7] argued that simple test time image processing, such
as translation, Gaussian noise, blurring, and re-sizing, can
equally neutralise the effect of AIPs, without having to re-
train the convnet. In our case study, we include those image
processing methods in the recogniser’s strategy space.
Robust AIPs against classifiers. Sharif et al. [32] pro-
posed a method for robustification by optimising an AIP
against a set of images, rather than a single image. This ap-
proach was also suggested by Moosavi et al. [20] for gen-
erating universal perturbations. In our work, we consider
optimising the AIP against a set of jittered versions of the
target input. We will show empirically that this enables a
targetted defense against image processing strategies.
AIP for identity obfuscation. This paper advocates the
AIP as an effective and aesthetic means for disabling recog-
nition. Previously Sharif et al. [32] also used adversarial
optimisation to fool a person recogniser. Compared to their
limited setup (fixed pose, fixed recognition strategy), our
case study covers a large-scale social media setup with user-
recogniser dynamics.
Person recognition task. Our case study considers the per-
son recognition task in social media setup [5, 38, 27], as op-
posed to face recognition [9] (frontal faces, good lighting)
or pedestrian re-identification [2, 1] (low resolution, fixed
context). Social media photos capture subjects appearing in
diverse range of viewpoints, poses, clothings, and events.
Zhang et al. introduced PIPA [38], the first large-scale so-
cial media person recognition dataset and benchmark. Our
empirical studies are built upon this dataset.
Person recognition models. Multiple researchers have
proposed person recognition techniques in social media
photos. Zhang et al. [38] proposed to combine cues from
multiple body parts obtained by poselet detections. Oh et
al. [27] greatly simplified [38] while achieving the state of
the art performance. We build our recogniser model upon
[27], possibly with more advanced network architectures. A
concurrent work by Liu et al. [17] claims to have improved
the method via metric learning objective. There exist other
works [14, 28, 15], which exploit social media metadata.
3. User-Recogniser Game
This section provides a general framework for studying
user-recogniser games. The framework provides a tool for
systemising the path from a set of explicit assumptions on
the players to game theoretical conclusions.
Our user-recogniser game framework is visualised in fig-
ure 2. The user U perturbs the original image x according
to a strategy i ∈ Θu, aiming to thwart recognition. The re-
cogniser R processes the perturbed image ri(x) according
to a strategy j ∈ Θr, aiming to neutralise the effect of im-
age perturbation. The resulting image nj(ri(x)) is passed to
the model f to make a prediction. The game arises from the
fact that each player does not know the opponent’s strategy,
although they do know each other’s strategy space.
We introduce relevant game theoretical concepts and key
theoretical results in §3.1 to help formalise the framework
in §3.2. We discuss possible extensions in §3.3.
Figure 2: User-recogniser game on a single photo. Each player does not know the opponent’s strategy. Orange (blue) arrows
indicate actions taken by the user (recogniser). Information in the orange (blue) box is only available to the user (recogniser).
3.1. Two-Person Constant-Sum Games
We describe our system as a two-person game [26] con-
sisting of two players, the user U and the recogniser R with
designated strategy spaces, Θu and Θr.
As a result of each player committing to strategies i ∈
Θu and j ∈ Θr respectively, R receives a payoff of pij , the
recognition rate; U then receives a payoff of 1 − pij , the
mis-recognition rate.
Game theory suggests that it is sometimes better to ran-
domise the strategies. U can adopt a mixed (random)
strategy θu = (θui )i∈Θu , defined as a distribution over
the strategy space Θu, and similarly for R. With abuse
of notation we write p(θu, θr) :=
∑
i,j
θui θ
r
jpij for the ex-
pected payoff for R when the mixed strategies θu and θr
are taken. The payoff for U is derived and defined as∑
i,j
θui θ
r
j (1− pij) = 1− p(θu, θr) =: p′(θu, θr).
We say that a two-person game is a constant-sum game
if the players’ payoffs sum to a constant β independent
of the strategies. In our case, the recognition and mis-
recognition rates always sum to one (β = 1). A game is
finite if the strategy spaces are finite. We have the follow-
ing optimality theorem.
Theorem 1 (von Neumann [26], 1928). For a finite
constant-sum game, there exist optimal or minimax mixed
strategies θu? and θr? such that
p(θu?, θr) ≤ p(θu?, θr?) ≤ p(θu, θr?) ∀ θu, θr (1)
where v := p(θu?, θr?) is the value of the game.
Equation 1 implies that when R plays θr?, R is guaranteed
to have a payoff of at least v, regardless of U ’s strategy; if U
plays θu?, U is guaranteed to have a payoff of 1− v. In our
scenario, this means that U ’s optimal strategy guarantees a
certain mis-recognition rate, regardless of R’s strategy.
U ’s optimal strategies can be obtained efficiently via lin-
ear programming that solves the following (R’s optimal
strategy can be found by swapping min and max):
arg min
θu
max
θr
∑
i,j
θui θ
r
jpij s.t. θ
u, θr are distributions.
(2)
If U has knowledge on R’s strategy θ¯r, then U can
take advantage of this knowledge. U can optimise her
strategy given θ¯r to attain a payoff of max
θu
p′(θu, θ¯r) ≥
p′(θu?, θ¯r) ≥ p′(θu?, θr?) = 1 − v, a potentially better
payoff than the no-knowledge scenario 1 − v. However, if
R’s strategy is optimal θ¯r = θr?, then the knowledge does
not bring improvement for U : max
θu
p′(θu, θr?) = 1− v.
In reality, not all players play optimally either due to the
lack of knowledge (e.g. on the opponent’s strategy space),
or due to pure irrationality. We refer to such a player as an
irrational player. Our discussion above implies:
Corollary 1. If U knows R’s strategy θ¯r, and if it is subop-
timal, then U can enjoy a better payoff than 1− v.
3.2. Components of the User-Recogniser Game
We specify the payoffs, strategy spaces, and information al-
lowed for the user U and the recogniser R.
Test data. We assume that the test data are distributed ac-
cording to (xˆ, yˆ) ∼ D. This dataset is the source of private
information that the two players compete for.
Fixed model. We assume that U and R use a fixed model
f (e.g. a publicly available model). This is a reasonable
assumption, as U and R often would not have resources to
train modern convnets.
Known model. Each player is aware that the opponent uses
f . This may be unrealistic, but provides a good starting
point. Relaxation of this assumption is discussed in §3.3.
Payoff. When the players commit to strategies i ∈ Θu and
j ∈ Θr, R’s payoff is the recognition rate on the test set:
pij = P
(xˆ,yˆ)∼D
[
arg max
y
fy (nj (ri (xˆ))) = yˆ
]
(3)
where fy denotes the model prediction score for class y. U
receives the payoff 1− pij , the mis-recognition rate.
User’s strategy space Θu. We consider additive perturba-
tions such that for an input x,
ri (x) = x+ t(x), ||t(x)||2 ≤  (4)
for some constant  > 0. When  is small enough, the per-
turbation is nearly invisible to human eyes (see figure 3).
These perturbations are frequently referred to as adversarial
image perturbations (AIPs). We discuss existing AIPs and
our novel variants in §4.
Recogniser’s strategy space Θr. R aims to neutralise the
adversarial effect of AIPs. Although some works have sug-
gested re-training the model with AIPs, demonstrating cer-
tain degree of robustification [6, 10], Graese et al. [7] has
argued that simple image processing can already neutralise
the AIP effects cheaply and effectively. They have demon-
strated that on MNIST, translation (T), Gaussian additive
noise (N), blurring (B), and cropping & re-sizing (C) have
improved the recognition rate from 0% (post-AIP) to 68%,
58%, 65%, and 76%, respectively. In our case study, we
will include these transformations in Θr. In §3.3, we will
discuss about expanding strategy spaces.
Known strategy spaces. The strategy spaces for each
player (Θu and Θr) are known to each other, while the
chosen strategies are not known.
Multiple recognisers. U may encounter a set of recog-
nisers not all of which are malicious. For example, U up-
loads her personal photos to a cloud service with a recogni-
tion system R1; she wants an AIP that enables a successful
recognition by R1 but disables recognition by a malicious
system R2. We propose an approach for generating select-
ive AIPs in §4.2 and confirm their existence in §5.5. From
a theoretical standpoint, the existence of selective AIPs at-
test to the diversity of possible AIP patterns, in line with the
existence of universal perturbations [20].
3.3. Extensions
In the previous section, we have introduced the user-
recogniser game framework with particular assumptions ex-
plored in this paper. In this section, we show that the frame-
work can be extended beyond this setup.
Unknown models. Many AIP techniques assume a full
knowledge on the model f , but the computation of black-
box AIPs is another active research field [29, 30, 24, 16]; U
can potentially adopt these methods.
Non-constant sum. If U and R assign different weights to
different test samples, then the payoffs may not sum to 1.
For such non-constant sum games, there exist Nash equilib-
rium strategies for each player [25]. The optimal strategy
and payoff analyses are still possible.
Non-additive AIPs. The framework allows ri to be any
function that induces invisible changes on the image. Cur-
rent restriction to equation 4 rules out e.g. one-pixel trans-
lation of the whole image. Most, if not all, prior work on
AIP is done in the additive setup. Crafting non-additive AIP
would be interesting future work.
Non-fixed models. R with enough computational re-
sources may re-train the model f with AIPs. One option
to expand our framework to such a setup would be to incor-
porate the model parameters in Θr. Brückner et al. [3] have
studied this setup, but have assumed convex loss functions.
Understanding games with continuous strategy spaces and
non-convex payoffs (e.g. convnet losses) is an open ques-
tion both for computer vision and game theory research.
Unknown strategy spaces. The exact possible set of
strategies may not be known to the opponent. With improv-
ing technologies, the respective strategy spaces may even
grow over time. The framework cannot do much about the
unknown strategies, but can adaptively expand the strategy
spaces according to technological developments.
4. Adversarial Image Perturbation Strategies
This section reviews existing adversarial image perturbation
(AIP) algorithms that use first-order optimisation schemes,
and proposes our novel variants.
We compute AIPs as additive transformations with L2
norm constraints (equation 4). Computation of AIP can be
formulated as a loss maximisation problem
max
t
L (f (x+ t) , y) s.t. ||t||2 ≤  (5)
where x is the input image and y is the ground truth label;
the loss function L is to be specified.
4.1. Existing AIP methods
Depending on the loss function L and the optimisation al-
gorithm, we recover most of the existing AIP methods such
as Fast Gradient Vector [31], Fast Gradient Sign [6], Basic
Iterative [12], and DeepFool [21]. The universal perturb-
ations introduced by Moosavi et al. [20] can also be seen
as a special case of equation 5 where the loss is computed
over the entire test set and the perturbation t is shared across
images. See table 1 for the summary.
Fast Gradient Vector (FGV) [31]. FGV adopts the softmax-
log loss L = − log fˆy in equation 5, solving it via one-step
gradient ascent: t? = −γ∇L(x) for some constant γ > 0.
Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) [6]. FGS is identical to FGV, ex-
cept that ∇L(x) is replaced with sign (∇L(x)).
Gradient Ascent (GA). This is a multi-step variant of FGV.
Perturbation is initialised at t(0) = 0. Gradient ascent is
performed on the loss function iteratively: t(m+1) = t(m)−
γ∇L(x+ t(m)) for m = 0, · · · ,K for some fixed step size
γ > 0 and maximal number of iterations K ≥ 1.
Variants Loss L Stopping Step sizecondition
FGS[6] − log fˆy 1 iteration Fixed
FGV[31] − log fˆy 1 iteration Fixed
BI[12] − log fˆy K iterations Fixed
GA − log fˆy K iterations Fixed
DF[21] fy
c − fy K it.∨ fooled Adaptive
GAMAN fy
? − fy K iterations Fixed
Table 1: Conceptual differences among AIP methods. fy
′
is
the model score for class y′, and fˆ denotes the softmax out-
put of f . y is the ground truth label, and y? is the most likely
label among wrong ones. yc is the label with the closest lin-
earised decision boundary.
Basic Iterative (BI) [12]. BI is identical to GA, except that
∇L(x) is replaced with sign (∇L(x)).
DeepFool (DF) [21]. DF algorithm solves the objective:
min
t
||t||2 s.t. arg max
y
fy (x+ t) 6= y (6)
which finds the minimal perturbation such that the pre-
diction is wrong. Although the objective is different, we
show that the DF algorithm can also be seen as a first-order
method solving equation 5 for some loss function.
DF first finds the class with the nearest decision hyper-
plane, denoted by c. To simplify the search, c is found on
the linear approximation of f around x (tangent function).
The normal vector to the decision hyperplane is given by
∇f c −∇fy . At each iteration, the algorithm computes the
minimal step size along this direction to reach the decision
hyperplane. Since f is not linear, the algorithm may need
more than one iterations to cross the decision hyperplane.
We observe that if we set the loss function as L =
f c − fy the gradient ascent direction matches the DF step
directions∇f c −∇fy . We thus regard DF as a gradient as-
cent algorithm with each step size minimised to just induce
a wrong prediction.
Projection and clipping. The norm constraint || · ||2 ≤  as
well as RGB value constraint to [0, 255] must be enforced
on the solution. [16, 12] suggest applying projections after
each iteration. We follow this practice. For BW images, we
average the gradients for each RGB channel.
4.2. Our AIP methods
As we will demonstrate in §5.2, the above approaches are
fragile to simple image processing techniques. We propose
novel AIP approaches here, focusing on robustness.
1Gaman is a Zen Buddhist term for endurance.
Gradient Ascent – Maximal Among Non-GT (GAMAN1).
Even if the prediction label is changed by the AIP, this
would not be robust if the perturbed input is still close to
the decision boundary. DeepFool (DF) is not expected to be
robust, as it stops iterations as soon as the decision boundary
is reached. On the other hand, DF guides the solution to the
closest decision boundary; if we let DF iterate beyond the
decision boundary with a fixed step size with fixed number
of iterations, the solution is likely to proceed more deeply
into the territory of the wrong label, improving robustness.
This motivates our GAMAN variant. Instead of the costly
computation of c at each iteration, we approximate c ≈
y? := arg min
y′ 6=y
fy
′
, the most likely prediction among wrong
labels. We set the loss function as L = fy? − fy , and
perform gradient ascent with a fixed step size γ for K itera-
tions. This approach is similar but different from the imper-
sonation AIPs previously considered [32, 16], which drive
the solution to a fixed impersonation target y¯. In contrast,
y? may change during the iterations.
Vaccination against image processing. The above meth-
ods maximise classification loss functions with respect to a
fixed recogniser. For countering an AIP-neutralising image
processing technique nj , we consider including the image
processing step in the loss function: L(nj(x + t)). Any
first-order method considered above can be used, as long as
nj is differentiable. If the processing function is random,
we average the gradients from multiple samples. We refer
to this technique as vaccination. Note that this technique is
complimentary to the above mentioned methods.
Selective AIPs. We present another complimentary tech-
nique for generating AIPs targetted to a selected subset of
recognisers. To avoid recognition from M while author-
ising B to recognise, we propose to maximise a mixed loss∑
k∈M
λkLk −
∑
k′∈B
λk′Lk′ (7)
with λk, λk′ > 0.
5. Empirical Studies
We have set up a game theoretical framework to study the
dynamics between the user U and the recogniser R. In par-
ticular, previous adversarial image perturbation (AIP) tech-
niques are studied, and new variants are proposed.
In this section, we present a case study of the framework
on person recognition. Before presenting the game the-
oretical analysis, we evaluate the performance of existing
and newly proposed AIP techniques (§5.2), and the effect-
iveness of R’s image processing strategies Θr (§5.3). The
full game is introduced (§5.4) after specifying U ’s strategy
space; we study this system in depth. Finally, we show res-
ults on the recogniser-selective AIPs (§5.5).
Perturbation AlexNet VGG Google ResNet
None 83.8 86.1 87.8 91.1
Im
ag
e
Pr
oc
. Noise ≥83 ≥85 ≥87 ≥90
Blur ≥82 ≥85 ≥86 ≥90
Eye Bar ≥81 ≥84 ≥84 ≥87
1-
It
er
.
A
IP FGS[6] 23.6 16.0 5.9 20.2
FGV[31] 13.3 11.5 4.6 20.0
K
-I
te
r.
A
IP
BI[12] 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.0
GA 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
DF[21] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GAMAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 2: Recognition rates after image perturbation. In all
methods, the perturbation is restricted to || · ||2 ≤ 1000. For
the baseline image processing perturbations, we only report
lower bounds (denoted ≥ · ).
5.1. Dataset and Experimental Setup
Dataset. We build our analysis upon the PIPA (People In
Photo Albums) [38], a large-scale dataset of social me-
dia photos crawled from Flickr. We use the val1 sub-
set of PIPA, consisting of 4820 instances of 366 identities
(val-original split1 in [27] terminology) as the test set.
We assume that the user uploads cropped head images to so-
cial media; PIPA provides the GT head boxes.
Person recogniser. The person recognition model f is built
on a state of the art framework [27]. It first trains a con-
vnet for the person recognition task on a large database of
random identities; it then tunes the final classification layer
to the test identities using about ten examples per identity.
In our case, we have used the val0, which is of the same
size and set of identities as as val1. While [27] only con-
sidered AlexNet [11], we also consider VGG [33], Google-
Net [35], and ResNet152 [8]. They show better recognition
rates (table 2).
Evaluation. We evaluate payoffs forR in terms of the ratio
of correctly identified instances in the test set. The payoff
for U is 1 minus R’s payoff. In all the tables, R is the
column player and U is the row player. For each column
(row), U ’s (R’s) optimal strategy is marked orange (blue).
5.2. Comparison of Perturbation Methods
AIP parameters. We set  = 1000 in all our experiments,
unless stated otherwise. For GoogleNet input 224 × 224,
this corresponds to 2% of pixels perturbed by 1/256. For
Gradient Ascent (GA) and Basic Iterative (BI) the step size
γ is set to 104; for GAMAN, 5×103. We set the maximal num-
ber of iterations K = 100, determined such that the norm
reaches  = 1000 in K iterations for most test samples.
Baseline perturbation methods. We consider three com-
monly used obfuscation types: noise, blur, and eye bar.
Noise adds iid Gaussian noise of variance σn; blur performs
convolution with a Gaussian kernel of size σb; eye bar puts a
gray horizontal bar of thickness σe on the upper 13 location.
They incur large L2 distances (> 1000) from the original
image even with small σn, σb, and σe. In table 2, we report
the lower bounds on the recognition rates at || · ||2 = 1000
by computing the rates at some || · ||2 > 1000.
AIP performance. We first evaluate all the considered AIP
methods against all network variants. Table 2 shows the res-
ults. We observe that noise, blur, and eye bar have nearly
no impact on the recognition performance for small L2 per-
turbations. AIP variants show better obfuscation perform-
ances. Vanilla gradient overall gives better obfuscation than
signed versions; on AlexNet Fast Gradient Vector (FGV) re-
duces the recognition rate to 13.3, compared to 23.6 for Fast
Gradient Sign (FGS); the multi-iteration analogues show
similar behaviours with Gradient Ascent (GA) achieving 0.2
compared to 1.2 by Basic Iterative (BI). Finally, we observe
that the DeepFool (DF) and GAMAN (§4.2) are very effective,
pushing the recognition rates down to zero.
Network performance. Comparing architectures, we ob-
serve that AlexNet is surprisingly robust to AIPs compared
to more recent architectures. GoogleNet, for example, per-
forms better than Alexnet without AIPs (83.8 vs 87.8);
when FGS is used, AlexNet performs 23.6 while Google-
Net performs 5.9. When multi-iteration AIPs are used, the
architectural choice does not have a significant impact. We
opt for GoogleNet in the next experiments; it is reasonably
performant, while being much faster than ResNet.
5.3. Robustness of AIPs
Basic processing Proc. Even before R’s image processing
strategies take place, the perturbed image needs to be (1)
re-sized to the original image (from the network input sizes)
and (2) quantised to integer values (e.g. 24-bit true color).
We denote the above two basic processing steps as Proc.
Image processing strateges Θr. We fully specify R’s
strategy space for our case study. Following Graese et al.
[7], we consider Θr = {Proc, T, N, B, C, TNBC}. Proc
is the basic processing described above, and all the other
strategies are applied over Proc. T is translation by a ran-
dom offset within 10% of the image side lengths. N adds iid
Gaussian noise with variance σ2 = 102. B blurs with Gaus-
sian kernel of width chosen from {1, 3, 5, 7, 9} uniformly at
random. C crops with a random offset within 10% of the
image side lengths and re-sizes back to the original. For
each strategy, the recogniser ensembles the scores from five
random samples. We also consider the combination of all
four (TNBC). It runs the model four times on each pro-
cessed image and once on the original; the scores are then
averaged.
Perturb ∅ Proc T N B C TNBC
None 87.8 87.8 87.6 64.0 81.2 85.4 87.3
BI[12] 0.0 8.3 15.8 16.8 28.6 27.4 17.6
GA 0.0 8.6 13.2 14.1 28.4 23.7 16.4
DF[21] 0.0 51.8 75.6 56.5 72.5 76.9 75.5
GAMAN 0.0 4.0 6.6 15.0 22.2 16.7 9.9
Table 3: Robustness analysis of AIPs on GoogleNet. AIPs
are restricted to to || · ||2 ≤ 1000. Proc indicates the re-
sizing and quantisation needed to convert AIP outputs to
image files. (T,N,B,C) = (Translate, Noise, Blur, Crop).
Robustness of AIPs. Table 3 shows the recognition rates
for the GoogleNet when R’s processing strategies are
present. While the multi-iteration AIPs induce zero re-
cognition rates without any processing, Proc already ex-
hibits powerful neutralisation effects: recognition rates for
Gradient Ascent (GA) and DeepFool (DF) jump from zero to
8.6 and 51.8, respectively. The instability of DF is due to
early stopping (§4.1). The processing strategies by R fur-
ther increase recognition rates. Blurring B and cropping C
strategies prove to be more harmful to AIPs than translation
T and noise N in general. Comparing AIP-wise, we show
that our novel variant GAMAN (§4.2) dominates other meth-
ods against all processing strategies but N; GA performs bet-
ter in that case, but only by a small amount (14.1 versus
15.0). Subsequent analyses are built on GAMAN.
Qualitative. Qualitative examples of the methods are
shown in figure 3. The images and the prediction results
are after Proc. GA and GAMAN reliably induces misidentific-
ation without sacrificing aesthetics compared to blurring.
5.4. User-Recogniser Games
Vaccination strategies Θu. In response to the processing
strategies by the recogniserR, the user U may vaccinate the
AIP against expected processing types (§4.2). We consider
six variants Θu = {GAMAN, /T, /N, /B, /C, /TNBC}. We use
slash / to indicate vaccination on GAMAN. For /T, /N, /B, /C,
gradients from 5 random function samples are averaged at
each iteration. The combination strategy /TNBC averages 4
gradients from individual methods and 1 original gradient,
resulting in the same number of gradient computations for
all vaccination variants.
Is vaccination helpful? Table 4 shows the recognition
rates of GoogleNet for combinations of discussed pro-
cessing and vaccination strategies. We observe indeed that
each vaccination type makes the vanilla AIP GAMAN more
robust against the respective processing type: for B the rate
drops from 22.2 to 5.8. /B is the most effective strategy for
U against all processing strategies except for N. For N, the
corresponding vaccination /N yields the best payoff for U .
Recogniser Θr
User Θu Proc T N B C TNBC
GAMAN 4.0 6.6 15.0 22.2 16.7 9.9
/T 2.5 2.3 11.6 18.5 7.2 4.9
/N 5.8 7.6 4.6 23.6 16.6 9.1
/B 0.4 0.8 8.6 5.8 3.1 1.4
/C 2.6 2.2 11.8 18.1 3.4 4.3
/TNBC 0.7 0.9 5.2 9.5 3.2 2.0
Table 4: Recogniser’s payoff table pij , i ∈ Θu and j ∈ Θr.
The user’s payoff is given by 100− pij .
We conjecture this is because the noise N results in high fre-
quency patterns while the others smooth the output. We ob-
serve, finally, that the combined vaccination /TNBC cannot
prepare AIP against all processing types most effectively;
given a budget on the number of gradient computations, it
is hard to be good at everything.
Optimal deterministic strategy. We can regard table 4
as the payoff table pij for R for strategies i ∈ Θu and
j ∈ Θr. Let’s first assume that the players only choose
fixed strategies. Then, solving equation 2 with determinism
constraints θui , θ
r
j ∈ {0, 1} yields U ’s optimal strategy as
/B with a privacy guarantee of at most 8.6 recognition rate.
Optimal random strategy. Game theory suggests that it is
sometimes better to randomise strategies. Solving equation
2 without the integral constraints yield the optimal solutions
for U and R as θu? = (/B : 61%, /TNBC : 39%) and θr? =
(N : 52%,B : 48%), respectively. Playing θu? guarantees
U to allow at most 7.3 recognition rate, an improved privacy
guarantee than the deterministic case, 8.6.
Knowledge on R’s strategy. As discussed in §3.1, having
knowledge on R’s strategy can improve the payoff bound
for U , if R does not play the optimal strategy. Let us con-
sider two possible non-optimal strategies played by R. (1)
If R commits to B, U ’s optimal strategy is the minimal row
in the column B: /B, with recognition rate 5.8. (2) If R
randomises uniformly over Θr, U ’s optimal strategy is the
minimal row over the column average: /B with recognition
rate 3.4. In both cases, U enjoys lower recognition rates.
Limited knowledge on Θr. Assume that U is not aware of
all possible technologies that R has at hand. For example,
the strategy N is not known to U . Then, U ’s apparent op-
timal solution is (/B : 100%), which she thinks will guar-
antee her at most 5.8 recognition rate. R can then attack U
with N, incurring 8.6 recognition rate. Limited knowledge
on the opponent’s strategy space does hurt.
5.5. Selective AIPs
We assume that U wants to avoid identification by a set of
malicious recognisers M, while authorising identification
Original Blur GA DF[21] GAMAN GAMAN
L2 = 0 L2 = 4107 L2 = 1000 L2 = 119 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000
L2 = 0 L2 = 5666 L2 = 1000 L2 = 173 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000
Figure 3: Perturbed images after Proc and the corresponding predictions (green for correct, red for wrong). GA and GAMAN
reliably confuse the classifier at almost no cost on the aesthetics. At L2 = 2000, GAMAN does show small artifacts.
Setup M averaged B averaged
M B L2 w/o AIP w/ AIP w/o AIP w/ AIP
{G} ∅ 1000 87.8 4.0 - -
{G} {A} 1000 87.8 8.7 83.8 97.9
{A,R} {V,G} 1000 87.4 17.7 87.0 97.7
{A,R} {V,G} 2000 87.4 3.8 87.0 97.8
Table 5: Selective AIPs. AIPs are crafted to confuse M
leaving B intact. [A,V,G,R] = [AlexNet, VGG, GoogleNet,
ResNet152]. GAMAN has been used in all experiments. Re-
ported performances are after Proc.
by benign ones B. We set up the experiments in table 5. We
include the GAMAN performance on GoogleNet as a baseline
(first row). We solve equation 7 with λk = 1 for all k ∈
M∪ B to generate selective AIPs.
When M = {GoogleNet} and B = {AlexNet}, the
generated AIP incurs mere 8.7 identification for M (after
Proc), while allowing B to identify 97.9 percent. We thus
confirm the selectivity. However, this comes at the cost of
increased recognition rate forM (8.7), compared to when
AIP only had to confuseM (4.0).
We also consider the multi-M, multi-B case given by
M = {AlexNet, ResNet} and B = {VGG, GoogleNet}.
The average performance is 17.7 for M, and 97.7 for B,
post Proc. Selectivity thus works for multiple models, but
again the recognition rates forM are quite high (17.7). We
remark that by increasing the budget on perturbation size
from 1000 to 2000, we can still attain a lower rate: 3.8.
The existence of selective AIPs is not only of practical
but also of theoretical interest. They show that the space of
AIPs is diverse enough to accommodate patterns that sim-
ultaneously hamper and assist recognition.
6. Discussion & Conclusion
Game theoretical approach. Game theory is a tool for
wading through uncertainties in players’ choices, providing
payoff guarantees independent of the opponent’s strategies.
Game theory also suggests that if there is no single techno-
logy which best copes with all possible adversarial techno-
logies, it is better to randomise existing techniques.
As discussed in §3.3, the game theoretical framework
introduced in this paper can be extended to other setups,
where less resource constraints are placed on each player.
This paper serves as a first step towards the promising re-
search direction of analysing the user-recogniser dynamics.
Conclusion. In this work, we have constructed a game the-
oretical framework to study a system with two players, user
U and recogniserR, with antagonistic goals (dis-/enable re-
cognition). We have examined existing and new adversarial
image perturbation (AIP) techniques for U . As a case study
of the framework, we have presented a game theoretical
analysis of the privacy guarantees for a social media user,
assuming strategy spaces that include the state of the art
AIPs and person recognition techniques.
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Supplementary Materials
A. Contents
The supplementary materials contain auxiliary experiments
for the empirical analyses in the main paper. In particular,
we include:
• Score loss for adversarial image perturbation (AIP).
• AIP performance at different L2 norms.
• Experiments for the non-GoogleNet architectures.
• More qualitative results.
As in the main paper, we mark the optimal entry in each
column (row) for the user (recogniser) with orange (blue).
B. Score Loss for AIPs
In the main paper, we have reviewed variants of AIPs
according to the loss functions and the optimisation al-
gorithms. Algorithms FGV, FGS, BI, and GA use the
softmax-log loss − log fˆy . The DeepFool (DF) and our
GAMAN variants use the difference of two scores (e.g. fy
? −
fy). This section includes an auxiliary analysis for the ef-
fect of the loss type: softmax-log loss− log fˆy versus score
loss −fy . We denote the score loss analogues with the suf-
fix -S (e.g. FGS-S). We also include FGMAN (Fast Gradient –
Maximal Among Non-GT), the single iteration analogue of
GAMAN, for completeness. See table 6 for a summary.
The corresponding empirical performances are shown in
table 7 and 9. Since single-iteration AIPs are significantly
outperformed by the multi-iteration AIPs, we have focused
on the latter in the main paper, and so do we here. In table
7, we observe that the choice of the loss function does not
make much difference. Table 9 further supports this view
against image processing techniques, although the softmax-
log loss does perform marginally better.
C. AIP Performance at Different L2 Norms
In the main paper, we have used the L2 norm constraint
 = 1000 as the default choice. In this section, we examine
the behaviour of AIP performance at varying  values.
See figure 4 for the plot. The performances are post-
Proc (§5.3). We fix the step size to γ = 104 (5 ×
103 for GAMAN), and the maximal number of iterations
to K = 100; we choose the norm constraint  from
{100, 200, 500, 1000, 2000}. The norm of the resulting AIP
is upper bounded by , but may not necessarily be exactly .
The average norm across the test set is plotted.
We observe that the AIP variants are much more effect-
ive than Noise, Blur, or Eye Bar, achieving the same de-
gree of obfuscation at 1 ∼ 2 orders of magnitude smaller
Variants Loss L Stopping Step sizecondition
FGS[6] − log fˆy 1 iteration Fixed
FGV[31] − log fˆy 1 iteration Fixed
FGS-S −fy 1 iteration Fixed
FGV-S −fy 1 iteration Fixed
FGMAN fy
? − fy 1 iteration Fixed
BI[12] − log fˆy K iterations Fixed
GA − log fˆy K iterations Fixed
BI-S −fy K iterations Fixed
GA-S −fy K iterations Fixed
DF[21] fy
c − fy K it.∨ fooled Adaptive
GAMAN fy
? − fy K iterations Fixed
Table 6: Extended version of table 1 in the main paper; ad-
ditional methods are denoted as gray cells. fy
′
is the model
score for class y′, and fˆ denotes the softmax output of f .
y is the ground truth label, and y? is the most likely label
among wrong ones. yc is the label with the closest linear-
ised decision boundary. y˜ is the least likely label.
Perturbation AlexNet VGG Google ResNet
None 83.8 86.1 87.8 91.1
Im
ag
e
Pr
oc
. Noise ≥83 ≥85 ≥87 ≥90
Blur ≥82 ≥85 ≥86 ≥90
Eye Bar ≥81 ≥84 ≥84 ≥87
1-
It
er
.
A
IP
FGS[6] 23.6 16.0 5.9 20.2
FGV[31] 13.3 11.5 4.6 20.0
FGS-S 27.8 6.2 1.0 4.3
FGV-S 21.0 5.5 3.5 8.0
FGMAN 4.4 3.9 2.8 11.5
K
-I
te
r.
A
IP
BI[12] 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.0
GA 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
BI-S 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.0
GA-S 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
DF[21] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GAMAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 7: Extended version of table 2 in the main paper; new
entries are denoted as gray cells. Recognition rates after
image perturbation. In all methods, the perturbation is re-
stricted to || · ||2 ≤ 1000. For the baseline image processing
perturbations, we only report lower bounds (denoted ≥ · ).
perturbations. At the same norm level, the multi-iteration
variants (BI,GA) are more effective than the single-iteration
analogues (FGS,FGV). Taking gradient signs decreases the
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Figure 4: GoogleNet accuracy after various perturbations
methods at different L2 norms. All results are after Proc.
obfuscation performance at small L2 norms (≤ 1000), but
they converge to a similar performance at  = 2000. Deep-
Fool (DF) outputs have small norms ≤ 100 due to early
stopping. Our variant GAMAN performs best across all norm
levels, achieving nearly zero recognition at  = 2000.
D. Non-GoogleNet Experiments
In the main paper, we have focused on the GoogleNet res-
ults for the AIP robustness analysis and the game theor-
etic studies (table 3 and 4). We extend the experiments to
AlexNet, VGG, and ResNet152.
D.1. Robustness Analysis
See table 9 for the robustness analyses for all four networks.
We confirm here again that GAMAN shows overall best ro-
bustness, across image processing techniques (Proc, T, N,
B, C, and TNBC), across architectures. For AlexNet and
ResNet, cropping (C) is the most powerful neutralisation,
while for VGG and GoogleNet blurring (B) is. We observe
that the effects are particularly strong for ResNet; C boosts
the performance from 0.0 to 31.8 against GAMAN.
D.2. Game Analysis for Various Networks
See table 10 for the payoff tables for all four networks.
We summarise the optimal user strategy θu? and the cor-
responding guarantee on the recognition rate in table 8.
Note that against all but AlexNet architecture, the optimal
strategy θu? is given as a mixture of /B and /TNBC.
E. Additional Qualitative Results
We include more qualitative results (equivalent to figure 3
in the main paper). See figures 5, 6, 7, 8.
Network Optimal Strategy θu? Bound onRec. Rate
AlexNet (/B : 100%) ≤6.4
VGG (/B : 86%, /TNBC : 14%) ≤4.9
GoogleNet (/B : 61%, /TNBC : 39%) ≤7.3
ResNet (/B : 31%, /TNBC : 69%) ≤8.5
Table 8: Optimal strategies and the corresponding guaran-
teed upper bounds on the recognition rate for different net-
works. We write ≤ · to denote the upper bound.
AlexNet
Perturb ∅ Proc T N B C TNBC
None 83.8 83.8 83.7 77.8 78.7 80.1 83.9
BI[12] 1.2 10.0 29.7 20.8 26.6 34.3 23.3
GA 0.2 4.8 13.6 11.6 17.7 17.8 12.2
BI-S 1.2 10.1 31.2 21.0 27.2 35.7 23.3
GA-S 0.2 5.0 15.4 12.6 19.0 19.3 12.8
DF[21] 0.0 62.1 76.5 68.5 69.4 75.0 74.7
GAMAN 0.0 1.4 6.4 9.2 13.5 12.3 5.6
VGG
Perturb ∅ Proc T N B C TNBC
None 86.1 86.1 84.8 77.2 81.5 84.1 85.8
BI[12] 0.5 6.8 11.1 18.1 23.2 16.8 14.4
GA 0.0 4.2 5.5 11.2 17.2 10.2 8.2
BI-S 0.3 7.1 11.2 19.2 23.8 17.3 14.3
GA-S 0.0 4.8 5.9 11.9 18.6 11.3 8.8
DF[21] 0.0 53.3 66.3 65.9 69.4 69.2 71.4
GAMAN 0.0 1.6 2.1 8.5 11.8 5.6 3.5
GoogleNet
Perturb ∅ Proc T N B C TNBC
None 87.8 87.8 87.6 64.0 81.2 85.4 87.3
BI[12] 0.0 8.3 15.8 16.8 28.6 27.4 17.6
GA 0.0 8.6 13.2 14.1 28.4 23.7 16.4
BI-S 0.0 8.8 17.2 17.7 29.3 28.8 18.8
GA-S 0.0 9.1 14.9 15.2 29.3 25.5 18.0
DF[21] 0.0 51.8 75.6 56.5 72.5 76.9 75.5
GAMAN 0.0 4.0 6.6 15.0 22.2 16.7 9.9
ResNet
Perturb ∅ Proc T N B C TNBC
None 91.1 91.1 90.6 72.0 87.2 89.3 90.8
BI[12] 0.0 10.9 36.8 24.8 32.8 45.3 26.3
GA 0.0 15.2 37.3 24.4 36.9 43.7 28.9
BI-S 0.0 13.0 43.4 27.4 35.8 51.5 29.9
GA-S 0.0 19.4 45.0 27.1 40.2 50.3 33.3
DF[21] 0.0 52.9 83.1 65.0 76.8 84.2 80.9
GAMAN 0.0 7.3 23.4 23.3 28.2 31.8 18.4
Table 9: Extended version of table 3 in the main paper for
all four network architectures; additional AIP entries are de-
noted as gray cells. Robustness analysis of AIPs for various
convnet architectures. AIPs are restricted to || · ||2 ≤ 1000.
(T,N,B,C) = (Translate, Noise, Blur, Crop).
AlexNet
Recogniser Θr
User Θu Proc T N B C TNBC
GAMAN 1.4 6.4 9.2 13.5 12.3 5.6
/T 0.9 0.8 6.2 10.5 2.7 2.2
/N 1.2 4.2 4.8 11.7 9.5 3.9
/B 0.8 3.5 6.3 6.4 6.0 2.6
/C 2.4 2.5 9.2 13.1 1.3 3.4
/TNBC 0.6 1.2 4.5 7.8 2.9 1.9
VGG
Recogniser Θr
User Θu Proc T N B C TNBC
GAMAN 1.6 2.1 8.5 11.8 5.6 3.5
/T 1.5 1.2 8.1 12.3 3.2 2.8
/N 2.0 2.5 3.9 12.6 6.7 3.9
/B 0.3 0.7 5.0 4.5 2.2 1.2
/C 2.0 1.6 9.5 14.0 1.9 3.1
/TNBC 0.6 0.7 4.3 7.3 2.3 1.4
GoogleNet
Recogniser Θr
User Θu Proc T N B C TNBC
GAMAN 4.0 6.6 15.0 22.2 16.7 9.9
/T 2.5 2.3 11.6 18.5 7.2 4.9
/N 5.8 7.6 4.6 23.6 16.6 9.1
/B 0.4 0.8 8.6 5.8 3.1 1.4
/C 2.6 2.2 11.8 18.1 3.4 4.3
/TNBC 0.7 0.9 5.2 9.5 3.2 2.0
ResNet
Recogniser Θr
User Θu Proc T N B C TNBC
GAMAN 7.3 23.4 23.3 28.2 31.8 18.4
/T 2.9 2.8 16.6 19.0 5.4 5.8
/N 5.3 12.9 4.2 23.5 20.1 10.2
/B 0.6 3.1 13.0 6.8 5.3 2.4
/C 3.5 3.1 17.0 18.8 3.2 5.4
/TNBC 0.7 1.2 6.5 9.3 2.9 2.3
Table 10: Extended version of table 4 in the main paper for
all four network architectures. Recogniser’s payoff table
pij , i ∈ Θu, j ∈ Θr, for various convnet architectures. The
user’s payoff is given by 100− pij .
Original Blur GA DF[21] GAMAN GAMAN GAMAN
L2 = 0 L2 = 7425 L2 = 1000 L2 = 0 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
L2 = 0 L2 = 1865 L2 = 1000 L2 = 51 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
L2 = 0 L2 = 4067 L2 = 1000 L2 = 12 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
Figure 5: Randomly chosen perturbed images after Proc and the corresponding GoogleNet predictions (green for correct,
red for wrong). Perturbations are visualised with gray background. GA and GAMAN reliably confuse the classifier at almost no
cost on the aesthetics. As the L2 norm increases, artifacts become more visible. Perturbations may be too small to be visible
when printed; zoom in in electronic version for better visibility.
Original Blur GA DF[21] GAMAN GAMAN GAMAN
L2 = 0 L2 = 7957 L2 = 1000 L2 = 52 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
L2 = 0 L2 = 5071 L2 = 1000 L2 = 185 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
L2 = 0 L2 = 5123 L2 = 1000 L2 = 144 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
Figure 6: Randomly chosen perturbed images after Proc and the corresponding GoogleNet predictions (green for correct,
red for wrong). Perturbations are visualised with gray background. GA and GAMAN reliably confuse the classifier at almost no
cost on the aesthetics. As the L2 norm increases, artifacts become more visible. Perturbations may be too small to be visible
when printed; zoom in in electronic version for better visibility.
Original Blur GA DF[21] GAMAN GAMAN GAMAN
L2 = 0 L2 = 5365 L2 = 1000 L2 = 138 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
L2 = 0 L2 = 3813 L2 = 1000 L2 = 89 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
L2 = 0 L2 = 6539 L2 = 1000 L2 = 113 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
Figure 7: Randomly chosen perturbed images after Proc and the corresponding GoogleNet predictions (green for correct,
red for wrong). Perturbations are visualised with gray background. GA and GAMAN reliably confuse the classifier at almost no
cost on the aesthetics. As the L2 norm increases, artifacts become more visible. Perturbations may be too small to be visible
when printed; zoom in in electronic version for better visibility.
Original Blur GA DF[21] GAMAN GAMAN GAMAN
L2 = 0 L2 = 2586 L2 = 1000 L2 = 75 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
L2 = 0 L2 = 4855 L2 = 1000 L2 = 153 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
L2 = 0 L2 = 5018 L2 = 1000 L2 = 0 L2 = 1000 L2 = 2000 L2 = 3000
Figure 8: Randomly chosen perturbed images after Proc and the corresponding GoogleNet predictions (green for correct,
red for wrong). Perturbations are visualised with gray background. GA and GAMAN reliably confuse the classifier at almost no
cost on the aesthetics. As the L2 norm increases, artifacts become more visible. Perturbations may be too small to be visible
when printed; zoom in in electronic version for better visibility.
